Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 141-153 (13 pages)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26323324?seq=1
Despite seven years of experiments, U.S. public diplomacy against international terrorism has largely failed. What is most needed is a strong infusion of fresh ideas. The rhetorical branch of the offensive against terror has been utterly neglected. U.S. spokesmen should re-open the argument about terrorism’s rank immorality; amplify the voices of Muslim critics of terrorism; publicly deconstruct the ideas of outspoken terrorists; and point to such weaknesses as their lack of credentials in theology. Secondly, there is much room for vigorous and thoughtful defense of evident political alternatives to terror, especially moderation and the rule of law.
Any American can be pleased by certain successes wrought during the past seven hard years of global effort against terrorism. One of the many bright spots is the total success that has been achieved in homeland defense—there has not been a single Al Qaeda attack on American soil since September 2001. Another is the coalition’s destruction of the Taliban’s grip on power in Afghanistan, followed by the provision of help to indigenous Afghan leaders such as Hamid Karzai, who now have the chance to determine their home- land’s future.
But there is one respect in which United States has clearly failed: public diplomacy. At the end of October 2007, when Karen Hughes announced she would step down as head of the United States’ efforts in public diplomacy, she had served longer, but not notably more successfully, than her two predecessors in that vital State Department role. Charlotte Beers, and then Margaret Tutwiler, had resigned after struggling in the position, which leads not just the State Department’s efforts but also those of other U.S. agencies and departments. If the National Security Council was exercising good guidance in this arena, the general public could not tell it, nor could the Washington policy community feel it. Skilled observers, such as scholars at the Washington-based Institute of World Politics, and its President, John Lenczowski, found little to recommend in U.S. national efforts at public diplomacy; they became increasingly critical as the “locust years” of two presidential terms slipped past, and meetings with executive branch principals seemed to go nowhere. By